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ABSTRACT
The interactions between universities and businesses have become
key drivers of today’s economic growth and firms’ business suc-
cess. However, a key factor, the existing relationship between gov-
ernment and industry funding, is largely underexplored. This study
investigates the relationship between government and industry
funding for universities, in the context of developing countries,
specifically taking China as a case. We found that there is a substi-
tution effect between the two types of funding and this effect
varies from different types of universities. We discuss our findings
and draw implications for firms that seek to collaborate with
universities.
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There is growing awareness that knowledge is a key driver of economic development,
and the institutions associated with fostering knowledge generation and diffusion are
regarded as crucial to ensuring sustainable economic success (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013;
Lundvall, 1988). Many studies have demonstrated that high levels of interactions
between universities and firms play a vital role in explaining the successful economic
performance in the regions where they are located (Cooke, 1992; Gans & Stern, 2010;
Saxeninan, 1994). There is a generally accepted belief that universities often undertake
longer-term, higher-risk research activities, which constitute an essential contribution
to a country’s knowledge base and complement the research activities conducted by
the private sector (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002; Ning et al.,
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2016). In this regard, research on university and business interactions has proliferated
in recent decades. Many previous studies have examined the drivers of or barriers to
university-industry interactions and business funding for universities (Sharpe, 1991).
In terms of the motivations that drive university-industry collaborations and business
funding for universities, from the university perspective, the creation of university-
industry collaborative interactions may have significant strategic relevance to
universities because of their potential as a source of additional funding. From the
firm perspective, university-industry interactions may help to reduce high costs of
internal research and development (R&D), obtain access to ‘state of the art’ technol-
ogy, accelerate new innovations and new product development, and facilitate innov-
ation to meet market demands (Chan & Kanatas, 1985; Chatterji, 1996; Henderson
et al., 1998; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Radnejad et al., 2017; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981;
Tsai & Wang, 2008). Certain firms, especially in the sectors with high knowledge
demand, have a considerable interest in continuously cooperating with universities
(Lundvall, 2002). On the other hand, researchers have documented many barriers
that make industry-university collaborations difficult to achieve (Capwell, 1988;
D’Este et al., 2013; Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013; Lemley, 1999; Maslach, 2016; Perkmann &
Schildt, 2015). Frequently noted barriers include a long geographic distance, cultural
and institutional differences, regulatory barriers, and cognitive differences.
However, a key factor, the established relationship between government funding
and the funding raised from industry, is largely understudied. It seems that previous
studies have mainly assumed that universities are always there and ready to collabor-
ate with firms and to help firms to extract value for their innovation productivity
(Giuliani & Arza, 2009; Leydesdorff & Meyer, 2003; Perkmann & Schildt, 2015). This
assumption seems questionable. From a theoretical perspective, on the one hand, uni-
versities that are funded sufficiently by the government may have a reputation and
strengthened capabilities to collaborate with firms to get more funding, meaning that
there is a complementary relationship between government and industry funding
(Chan & Kanatas, 1985). On the other hand, the incentives of universities that are
funded more by the government to collaborate with firms may decrease, illustrating a
substitution effect between government and industry funding (Muscio et al., 2012).
From a practical perspective, many developed countries have reduced public expendi-
tures for university funding, including the US, the UK, France, Italy and Japan. In
contrast, in some developing countries, e.g., China, South Africa and Russia, there is
an increase in university funding from the government (Atkinson & Foote, 2019).
These controversial theoretical and practical arguments have thus made it necessary
to examine the relationship between government and industry funding, particularly in
an empirical manner. However, such work is scarce. One exception is the work by
Muscio and colleagues (2012), who studied Italian universities, and found that there
is a complementary effect between government funding and funding raised through
research contracts and consulting activities.
In the light of these arguments, this study intends to contribute to the critical
while under-investigated research question of whether government resources act as a
complement or substitute for industry funding in universities and how this relation-
ship differs between different types of universities. This study aims to contribute to
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the theory and practice. Theoretically, to date, our knowledge about university-busi-
ness interactions is predominantly limited in developed countries, with little know-
ledge from developing countries. Theoretical arguments related to these interactions
are mainly based on signalling theory and the resource-based view (Chan & Kanatas,
1985; Muscio et al., 2013; Rajan & Winton, 1995). Our work will thus bring novel
evidence to this line of inquiry based on the context of a developing country, China,
and it will most likely provide new theoretical arguments when taking an institutional
view, proven to be the most suitable theory for developing countries, to develop our
hypotheses. Practically, our research setting is particularly relevant to firms’ innova-
tions and business operations in developing countries. A typical feature of techno-
logical innovations is that, compared to their counterparts in developed countries,
firms in developing countries often lack internal R&D capabilities and technological
accumulation. In many cases, the technological capabilities of firms lag behind those
of co-located universities. Thus, firms heavily rely on ideas, knowledge and technol-
ogy from external sources, particularly local universities (Fu & Gong, 2011; Harzing
& Noorderhaven, 2006; Liu, 2005; Mutlu et al., 2015; Ning et al., 2016). Meanwhile,
the rapid rise of world-class universities in some developing countries has also
attracted many multi-national enterprises (MNEs) to establish R&D facilities for
advanced technology in these countries (Ghauri & Rao, 2009; Zhang et al., 2013).
Hence, universities, particularly certain newly emerged world-class universities, in
some developing countries are important for both domestic and foreign firms, specif-
ically for those performing R &D-oriented activities. Thus, understanding the rela-
tionship between industry and government funding to universities has significant
implications for firms’ collaborative strategy when seeking university knowledge in
developing countries. In the empirical analysis, this study takes China, the largest
developing country, as a case to investigate the research question.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 develops hypotheses and
Section 3 describes the data and methods. Section 4 presents the results. The final
section summarises and draws implications.
2. Theory and hypotheses
We build our hypotheses based on institutional theory. Institutional theory has been
widely used, and given that the institutional environment of developing countries are
in the process of transition and relatively less stable, it is likely to be more critical to
apply it in this context (Li, 2012). The existing research has documented that institu-
tions are the rules of the game, generally shaping actors in these institutional contexts
(North, 1990). In reviewing industry-university collaboration, the conclusion is
reached that the outcome of different relationships between government and industry
funding are largely shaped by specific institutions (Berbegal-Mirabent et al., 2015;
Canhoto et al., 2016; Chandrashekhar, 2006; Kerr & Nanda, 2015; Meyer-Krahmer &
Schmoch, 1998). The reason is that institutions substantially shape the structure of
university awareness, incentives, and capabilities in interaction with firms. As in the
case of our study, it may be stated that the stakeholders involved in such interactions
often have different motives and behaviours, and operate in different institutional
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environments (Han & Chuang, 2015; Mao & Xu, 2014; Taube, 2015; Zhu & Peng,
2012). This situation may lead to distinct relationships pertaining to the industry and
government funding in different institutional settings.
Previous studies in this field are mainly limited to Western countries with rela-
tively stable institutional environments. Thus, researchers mainly take the resource-
based view as their theoretical background (Grant, 1996; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2015;
Muscio et al., 2013; Nelson & Sampat, 2001; Sa & Litwin, 2011; Thune &
Gulbrandsen, 2011) and assume that universities will supply knowledge and pools of
highly skilled labour to industry and, in turn, industry will offer universities funding
to fill the gap left by governments due to increased tightening of expenditures in sup-
port of university research. Consequently, they predict that the financial pressure that
universities have been subject to will drive universities to seek alternative sources of
funding, stimulating university-industry interactions and collaborations. Therefore,
these cases mostly take the substitution view of the funding relationship between gov-
ernment and industry funding (i.e., a rise or reduction in government funding will
result in a corresponding reduction or rise in industry funding). However, other
researchers argue that government and industry funding may act as complement
from a signalling and reputational perspective (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Chan &
Kanatas, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). Under this assumption, government funding
aims to strengthen universities’ research capabilities and further produce high-quality
research results, which will ultimately become a potential resource for firms, and
meanwhile, the funding that universities receive from the government signals the
quality of their research to firms, ultimately attracting firms to allocate funding to
these universities. Thus, they predict that there is a complementary relationship
between government and industry funding.
In this study, we employ a different view, institutional theory, to predict the rela-
tionship between government and industry funding. In the context of development
countries such as China, we argue that institutional settings may lead us to predict
that government funding acts as a substitute for industry funding. We explain this
phenomenon based on the following aspects.
First, the funding system for university research in developing universities is usu-
ally highly dependent on government fund, and they may show less interest in indus-
try funding due to path dependence, particularly in the case of a rapid increase in
government funding to universities. Taking China as a case, since the foundation of
the new China in 1949, the Chinese funding system for university research is a typical
‘input-orientated’ system; resources are first allocated based on the size of the staff or
the number of students, particularly, graduate and Ph.D. students. Starting in the
mid-1980s, the Chinese funding system began to be reformed and gradually adopted
a performance-based system as part of its ‘input-orientated’ system (Liu & White,
2001). The typical landmark is the establishment of the China National Science
Foundation (CNSF) in 1986. Researchers at universities started to compete for
research funding on the basis of peer-reviewed project proposals against a set of
objectives. In the same year, China issued the ‘863 Plan’, which focussed on a few
important high-tech domains by taking advantage of heavy investment by the
Chinese central government, with the hope of catching up with developed countries.
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The initiative focussed on biotechnology, information technology, new energy, new
materials, space technology, laser technology and automatic technology. Similar to
NSF projects, scholars from universities, research institutes, and firms can apply for
funding for ‘863 Plan’ projects. In 1997, China started its National Key Basic
Research and Development Plan (the so-called ‘973 Plan’). The purpose of this pro-
gramme was to improve China’s basic research capability at the global frontiers of
science. Chinese universities have become a dominant player in this plan. In recent
years, China has initiated its ‘indigenous innovation’ strategy and, in parallel,
expanded its investment in university funding (Heald, 1993). These actions have led
to the prospect of China’s government funding to universities; for instance, according
to Chinese statistics, the growth rate of government funding for universities between
2001 and 2012 was 20.8%. The funding system becomes competitive but only within
the university community, which is still characterised as a central planned system. An
unexpected result, possibly due to the path dependent effect, is that it is difficult for
universities to change their perceived old model (Liu & White, 2001). Naturally, this
is also a response to China’s ambitious aim to make China a strong innovative nation
(Capwell, 1988; Heald, 1993). This seems logical because, in China, due to the weak
innovative capability of firms compared to their counterparts in advanced economies
and domestic universities, universities have apparently become the core driver in
helping the government realise its strategic goal, i.e., being one of the most innovative
countries in the world. Hence, this special institutional environment for university
funding makes universities more reliant on government resources.
Second, for developing economies, there is a large gap between the supply of uni-
versity scientific knowledge and industry demands. Most firms in developing coun-
tries often demonstrate weak technological capabilities and mainly focus on
traditional, middle- and low-tech industries (Fu et al., 2011). Thus, instead of directly
obtaining advanced technology from universities, most firms resort to universities to
better understand foreign imported relatively mature technology to help them absorb
the technology and to make the use of foreign imported technology more efficiently
(Nguyen, 2007). Meanwhile, to save cost, firms in developing countries might reduce
the expenditure on research and development with universities, and could not well
acknowledge and protect intellectual property and technology. Although the Chinese
government has called for indigenous innovations, the overall innovative capability
and the level of technology in developing countries remain not as advanced as the
developed countries, which lead to the relatively low industrial demand on domestic
university technology corporation and transfer. Being confined by the low demand of
industry, domestic universities might have less motivations to cooperate with firms
and would rather spend more time and financial resources to secure funding from
the government than from industry.
Third, the innovation chain, from scientific research, technology development, and
industrial applications among universities, research institutes, and firms in developing
countries, has been cut. Due to historical reasons and developmental reasons, univer-
sities in developing countries may have to learn and depend on the support from the
advanced universities in developed countries, and it is usually very hard for univer-
sities to develop a comprehensive innovation chain, which is a severe issue in China.
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Over a long period of time, China adopted the structure of its innovation system
from the former Soviet Union, which divides innovation efforts into research at uni-
versities, experiment and technology development at research institutes, and technol-
ogy application within industry. Close collaborations among universities, research
institutions and industry are the precondition for this innovation system. However,
due to the institutional reforms since the 1990s, the role of research institutes has
been reoriented to make them important market actors, and they were assumed to be
able to collect resources from markets instead of obtaining resources via the trad-
itional method of relying on government financing. As a result, except for a few
research institutes, most Chinese research institutes were dropped from the govern-
ment funding system and were transformed into enterprises. Thus, this reform has
hurt research institutes’ transition capabilities in the Chinese innovation system and
consequently leaves a gap between universities and industry. Currently, although the
Chinese government has realised this problem and has tried to bridge this gap by
strengthening universities’ technology transfer capabilities, time is also needed for
universities to learn and fill this gap if they are willing.
Fourth, the research assessment system for government funding competition
impedes university researchers from collaborating with industry. Research assessment,
geared towards article publications, project applications, and patent applications, has
become a common problem in Chinese universities and universities in some other
developing countries. In particular, in elite Chinese universities, the academic results
of researchers have been dramatically highlighted by university administrators for
promotion, income, and work evaluation. This mechanism results in less motivation
for researchers at universities to collaborate with industry – either to transfer their
technology to firms or to conduct joint research. Simultaneously, the emphasis on the
publication of scholarly papers and patent applications make the technology devel-
oped at universities far removed from commercialisation, which may further prevent
industry from collaborating with universities. Combining these factors, we thus pre-
dict the following:
H1: There is a substitution effect between government funding and industry funding to
universities in the context of China.
In order to catch up with the global top universities in advanced countries, the
governments in developing countries usually could not fund all the universities, and
one strategy is to introduce policy and implement strategy by raising the research
standards of selected universities and fund these universities. According to the
Matthew effect, after getting more government funding every year, there will be a
concentration of resources and talents, and an ongoing cumulative advantage in par-
ticular universities, because of the signalling effect of the government funding regard-
ing the innovation competitiveness of the universities (Merton, 1968). Early success
in acquiring government funding usually leads to later successes in financing and
research as these universities grow, while failing to acquire government funding may
be indicative of life-long problems in the development of the universities. In this situ-
ation, some universities have intensified the demand and maximised their capability
of obtaining governmental funding, which may also lead to a crowding-out effect for
industry funding. This Matthew effect also reduces the demand for industry funding,
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and exacerbates the education inequality. High level universities have less willingness
and demand to collaborate with firms and acquire industrial funding Whereas, lower
level universities may need more industrial support, while they are usually less valued
and often neglected by firms, which leads to low level of industrial funding supply
(Azoulay et al., 2014).
Without exception, as discussed above, a main feature of the Chinese funding sys-
tem to universities is that government funding dominates the system, whereas univer-
sities are not equally treated in terms of the funding. With this intent, the Chinese
government has been choosing approximately 100 universities first, followed by
another 30 universities, to invest additional funding in them (Capwell, 1988). In other
words, the specific amount of resources that Chinese universities have obtained from
the government is mostly decided by their status or ranking among all universities.
Thus, there is reason to believe that this main effect of government funding on indus-
try funding has boundary conditions, for example, the types of universities. Here, we
focus on the well-known and officially authorised types of universities (such as a
ranking system mainly based on universities’ strength in science and research), the
‘211 Project’ or ‘985 Project’ ranking system.
The ‘211 Project’ is the Chinese government’s primary endeavour aimed at
strengthening 100 universities and key disciplinary areas as a national priority for the
21st century. When a university is selected to be part of the ‘211 Project,’ a large
amount of money is annually invested by the Chinese government. It is a clear
‘input-orientated’ system, which is largely dominated by the Chinese government and
which simultaneously favours ‘211 Project’ universities while neglects universities that
do not belong to the ‘211 Project’ tier. This group of ‘211 Project’ universities
accounts for only 5% of Chinese universities, but the total funding for the universities
in this group takes more than 70% of Chinese funding resources.
The ‘985 Project’ was launched as a strengthened version of the ‘211 Project’,
focussing on a smaller group and a limited number of first-rate universities of
advanced international stature in the ‘211 Project’ group, which made the Chinese
university funding system become extremely uneven. This project was divided into
two stages. In the initial stage, nine universities were selected from the top 20
Chinese universities. Grants of more than 700 million (RMB), distributed over a
three-year period, were given to each of these nine universities. In the second stage,
this programme was expanded and now includes 39 universities, most of which
receive millions to billions each year.
A serious result of the funding allocation being dominated by the government is
the uneven distribution of Chinese research funding for universities. There is a large
gap between ‘211 Project’ universities and non-‘211 Project’ universities. For instance,
in 2013, the highest-ranking university (Tsinghua University) in the ‘985 Project’
group received 23 times larger amount of funding than the amount received by the
highest-ranking university (Southwest Petroleum University) in the non-‘211 Project’
group. Within the ‘211 Project’ group, government funding for ‘985 Project’ univer-
sities is larger than that for non-‘985 project’ universities. Therefore, the pyramid
structure of China’s government funding system, dominated by only a few leading
and advanced universities, may generate between-group differences regarding the
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industry-government funding relationship. Specifically, universities grouped in the
‘211 Project’, particularly those in the ‘985 Project’, may have sufficient funding from
the government and therefore may lose their interest in collecting funding from
industry. However, the universities that are not part of the ‘211 Project’ may have to
increase their funding through industry. Thus, this situation leads us to predict that
the relationship between Chinese government and industry funding may be mediated
by university types, which leads us to hypothesise the following:
H2: The substitution effect is mediated by the types of universities, i.e., it may be
stronger in top-tier universities, but weaker or even inexistent in lower-level universities.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data sources and sample selection
We use a unique dataset compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Education. Since 1994,
China has issued an official annual report, the Chinese University Science and
Technology (S and T) Development Annual Report (Gaodeng Xuexiao Keji Tongji
Ziliao Huibian). This report is the only report currently available regarding university
funding. It is a comprehensive statistical report that contains specific research infor-
mation on Chinese universities. Using this annual report, we can find basic informa-
tion on many university research activities, such as the number of personnel and
staff; the amount of funding from the government, industry and technology transfer;
the number of research projects, published papers and books; the number of patent
applications; and the number of research institutes at each university.
The number of universities collected in these annual reports varies from year to
year (see Table 1). All ‘211 Project’ universities (including ‘985 Project’ universities)
and the larger group of government-supported universities are included. Some
smaller and privately financed universities are selected for inclusion in the annual
reports. This dataset has primarily been used in prior studies (Zhang et al., 2013).
As Chinese universities have experienced a rapid development, to account for the
changing situation, we attempt to cover a relatively longer time range. Based on
the data availability, this study focuses on universities during the 2009–2018 period as
the sample in the study. Due to the merger of universities, university renaming, and
university closings during the sample period, we arrange the universities in the sam-
ple based on their names in 2018. In the case of mergers, we combine the values of
Table 1. University distributions in annual reports and sample selection.
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the indicators. For the renamed universities, we standardise their names based on
their names during the study period. For the universities that ceased operations, we
keep their records but omit them in the later years. For the universities that were
simultaneously merged and renamed, we aggregate the values of the relevant indica-
tors before their merger as one sample university, shown in the dataset by the new
name. After the data cleaning, the final distribution of the universities in our study
sample is presented in Table 1.
3.2. Variable measurements
To test the relationship between industry and government funding to universities, we
operationalise the dependent variable, F-industry, as the total amount of money that
a university obtains from collaborations with industry. Similarly, we define our main
independent variable, F-government, as an indicator of government funding, that is,
the volume of money that a university received from the Chinese government.
Several factors are included as controls. First, using the number of teaching and
research staff at a university, we control for university size (e.g. Zhang et al., 2013).
Second, following the work of Wang et al. (2016) using the number of published
papers and awards in the observed year, we control for a university’s research cap-
ability. Third, we control for a university’s supportiveness of its technology transfer
facility by using a dummy variable for whether the university owns a science park.
This factor is chosen because science parks are an important institutional innovation
for facilitating university-industry collaboration, possibly influencing a university’s
capacity to collect research funding from the government or industry (Salvador &
Rolfo, 2011). Fourth, a university’s R&D expenditure in each year is controlled, as in
some of the existing literature (Zhang et al., 2013). Fifth, we control for a university’s
professional type. Chinese universities have been categorised into different types (e.g.,
international research university, Chinese research university, regional research uni-
versity, disciplinary research university and specialty university). Five dummy varia-
bles are created, and the specialty university is omitted as the reference group. This
categorisation is based on the combined research potential and demonstrated capabil-
ity in support of social development as well as the university’s main domain in sci-
ence. Different types of universities may present different preferences for government
or industry funding. This university type is controlled, as in some of the previous lit-
erature (e.g. Muscio et al., 2013). Sixth, we control for university location by using
three dummy variables: Eastern, Central and Western China. Seventh, due to China’s
rapid transition, we include year dummies to reflect factors from the Chinese macro
level, such as institutional changes. Thus, we include dummy years in our analyses
and omit 2009 as the baseline year. Finally, to account for the influence of past
experience in obtaining industry funding, we introduce a 1-year lag of the dependent
variable. This control also aims to investigate whether evidence of an accumulation
advantage emerges along the lines of the Matthew effect argument.
We included a one-year lag of the dependent variable as an additional explanatory
variable; thus, our data structure becomes a dynamic panel, indicating that the inde-
pendent variables are not strictly exogenously correlated with past values and that the
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possibility of error exists. Meanwhile, we find that our panel comprises only a few
time periods (six) but many individual observations years (hundreds) (Greene, 2003).
In this case, the generalised method of moments (GMM) is recommended (Yang &
Li, 2011). Compared to a fixed-effect panel, a random-effect panel and pooled OLS
regressions, GMM also resolves the problem of university-specific effects, any poten-
tial endogeneity of all of the explanatory variables and the problem caused by the
lack of good external instruments in the model; thus, the GMM approach provides
more robust estimation results . In Stata 13.0, the xtabond2 command is used
(Stadler et al., 2014).
4. Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. Except for a few higher
correlations, e.g., the correlation between the number of published papers and the
number of staff members (0.838), most correlations are moderately low, indicating
that the collinearity among the main variables is low. Furthermore, a variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) test indicates that the highest VIF is 6.96, which is lower than the
critical threshold value of 10 (Chatterjee & Price, 1991). As the descriptive statistics
for the variables indicate, the universities in the sample differ significantly in terms of
government funding and industry funding. In addition, F-Government correlates
positively with No. staff, No. published papers, No. awards, Science Park and R&D
expenditure.
In Table 3, the total sample is divided into two parts according to the number of
publications. Universities in the fewer publication group can only acquire about 3.053
million government funding while universities in the more publication group acquire
117.179 million funding. The difference between two groups is statistically significant
at the 1% level, illustrating that more publication is associated with larger amount of
government funding.
Table 4 reports the estimation results based on GMM estimation, where the F-
industry and F-government variables are set as endogenous whereas the others are set
as exogenous variables. The AR (2) and Hansen tests show that all p-values are
greater than 0.05, which indicates that our modelling choices are appropriate. The F-
test statistics for all models are equal to 0, suggesting that our estimated models fit
our data very well at the aggregate level.
Model 1 in Table 4 reports the results of a regression that includes only the con-
trol variables. Our key explanatory variable, F-government, enters sequentially in
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. F-industry 27.008 76.824 0.000 463.544 1.000
2. F-government 60.263 162.749 0.000 1051.202 0.788 1.000
3. No. staff 796.607 1221.335 14.000 7813.000 0.571 0.703 1.000
4. No. published paper 724.907 1286.577 0.000 7761.000 0.772 0.860 0.838 1.000
5. No. award 4.532 9.590 0.000 54.000 0.714 0.731 0.749 0.811 1.000
6. Science park 0.105 0.307 0.000 1.000 0.635 0.604 0.467 0.615 0.568 1.000
7. R&D expenditure 61.859 166.749 0.000 1041.554 0.909 0.924 0.658 0.859 0.762 0.652
Note: a. The monetary unit is million Yuan (RMB). b. Dummies for university types, university locations and years are
not included.
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Model 2. In Model 2, using the full sample, it is found that the coefficient for govern-
ment funding is negative and significant. This finding supports Hypothesis1, indicat-
ing that there is a substitutive relationship between government and industry
funding. In other words, the finding illustrates that, in China, with the increase in
Chinese government investment in university research in recent years, universities
have generally become less involved with industry, particularly in activities related to
collaborative research and contract research. Government funding thus demonstrates
a ‘crowding-out effect’ on industry funding.
To test the moderating effect of the university grouping status (i.e., Hypothesis 2),
we split our sample into three groups: first-tier, second-tier and third-tier universities,
namely ‘985 Project’, ‘211 Project’ but non-‘985’, and non-‘211’ universities.
Sequentially, the regression results are presented in Models 3–5 in Table 2. In
Model 3 that is based on the sample of ‘985 Project’ universities, the coefficient of
F-government is negative and significant, which is similar to the result in Model 2.
This finding is consistent with our expectation that the more advanced a university
is, the less likely it is to raise funding from industry. Model 4 is based on the sample
of ‘211 Project’ but non-‘985’ universities. It is found that, although the coefficient of
F-government is negative and significant, the coefficient has become 0.166, a
smaller negative effect compare with 0.173 in Model 3. This finding illustrates that
Table 3. Government funding between different universities.
Fewer publications More publications
MeanDiffVariables N Mean N Mean
F-Government 5,030 3.053 5,056 117.179 114.126
Note:  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Table 4. Regression results based on GMM estimation (P12).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variables F-industry F-industry F-industry F-industry F-industry
Constant 4.692 0.647 1.554 0.148 0.300
(0.215) (1.719) (0.787) (0.449) (0.654)
F-industry(1) 0.334 0.708 0.561 0.709 0.341
(4.788) (50.472) (11.512) (95.706) (3.106)
No. staff 1.691 0.032 0.056 0.018 0.229
(3.717) (1.941) (0.373) (0.823) (1.855)
No. published paper 0.346 0.024 0.274 0.085 0.208
(2.768) (1.262) (3.156) (10.687) (2.022)
No. award 0.112 0.035 0.030 0.041 0.010
(1.700) (1.668) (0.457) (5.339) (0.108)
Science park 0.032 0.993 2.526 0.936 0.382
(0.012) (5.861) (2.203) (6.865) (0.935)
R&D expenditure 0.184 0.310 0.294 0.208 1.089
(1.790) (17.110) (2.989) (23.298) (5.454)
F-government 0.112 0.173 0.166 0.172
(6.214) (2.400) (19.690) (1.266)
Observations 10,086 10,086 417 1,025 9,061
AR(1) (p-value) 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.995 0.828 0.804 0.855 0.667
Hansen (p-value) 0.646 0.0609 1.000 0.529 0.195
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1; dummy variables are included but
are not shown.
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the substitutive relationship between government and industry funding seems rela-
tively weaker in the second-tier universities, compared to that in the first-tier
universities.
In Model 5, for the group of universities that are non-‘211 Project’, we find that
the coefficient of government funding becomes insignificant. This finding shows that,
for this group of universities, government funding has no effect on its capability to
collect industry funding. It also signifies that the amount of government financial
support is not a concern when industry firms decide to undertake research collabora-
tions with universities in this tier. Taken together, we find that Hypothesis 2 is sup-
ported, illustrating that the relationship between government and industry funding
differs in different types of universities. The less advanced an institution is, the
weaker the relationship is. This finding is consistent with the research of Chen and
Kenney (2007), who find that universities with less research capabilities demonstrate
less reliance on government funding when seeking industry funding.
As expected, there is some path dependence in terms of accessing industry fund-
ing. For all models (Models 1–5), the coefficients of the independent variable of the
industry funding in the previous year are positive and highly significant. In other
words, accessing industry funding increases the volume of funding from industry in
the future, which is consistent with the existence of a Matthew effect accumulation.
This finding is also consistent with certain previous studies, which state that the insti-
tutions that have already collaborated with universities are more likely to be involved
in overall technology transfer and other types of collaborations (e.g., Arvanitis
et al., 2008).
5. Discussion and conclusion
The interactions between universities and businesses have become central in today’s
economic development. In relative terms, research has proliferated in recent decades
(Bevc & Ursic, 2008; Maresova & Kuca, 2019). Among these studies, a major factor,
i.e., the existing relationship between government and industry funding, has been
widely overlooked when scholars seek to understand the factors that drive the interac-
tions between universities and businesses. Thus, this study aims to strengthen our
understanding of this issue in the context of developing countries. Using a dataset
based on Chinese universities, we investigate the relationship between government
and industry funding of universities. It is found that there is a substitution effect in
Chinese universities, meaning that an increase in government funding makes univer-
sities less inclined to pursue industry funding sources, and this relationship differs
among different types of universities.
Our finding contradicts the result of Muscio et al. (2013), who support the domin-
ance of the complementarity effect over the substitution effect based on the Italian
case (Aulakh et al., 2010; Martin & Salomon, 2003; Thursby & Thursby, 2011; Zhu &
Peng, 2012). One main reason for this difference may due to the difference in the
institutional context between developing countries, and developed countries.
Developing countries’ funding system for universities may make universities more
reliant on funding from the government, and firms in the relatively lower technology
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industries show less demand for knowledge from domestic universities than import-
ing technology from abroad. Again, the innovation system in many developing coun-
tries, research institutes, traditionally defined as the bridge between the scientific
research of universities and the commercialisation of firms, may have weakened their
role in technology development and product design due to that. the lacking of indus-
trial demand. Thus, more time is needed for universities to learn and ultimately fill
the gap that left behind by research institutes. Moreover, heavily academic-orientated
assessment system in some developing countries’ universities also makes researchers
reluctant to collaborate with firms. All of these arguments, from an institutional per-
spective, thus complement to the arguments of Western researchers from the
resource-based view or signalling theory (Muscio et al., 2013; Rajan & Winton, 1995;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). Therefore, we state that the resource-based view and signal-
ling theory both somehow reflect the mechanisms in a mature market economy in
which a stable institutional environment holds. When the scenario shifts to develop-
ing countries with an unstable institutional setting, the relationship between govern-
ment and industry funding is most likely driven by the country’s specific institutions.
The nature of the government and industry funding relationship is thus a contextual
phenomenon in general.
Thus, our findings offer several implications for firms. First, we suggest that, in
general, Chinese universities may not be very interested in collaboration with firms
for direct reward, i.e., financial resources. Therefore, firms need to change their col-
laboration strategies from directly buying or licencing technology and technical serv-
ices to some relational and long-term activities, for example, joint research. This is
particularly true for foreign firms that target the advanced technology of China’s elite
universities. Second, in some cases in which firms have to choose to collaborate with
universities, particularly for short-term or quasi-market activities, all things being
equal, firms choose universities with weaker research capabilities, which may increase
the success rate because these universities demonstrate preferences for research fund-
ing from industry. Collaborating with universities with a relatively weak capability in
research and technology may be appropriate for developing Chinese firms because
they typically focus on middle- and low-technology fields. Finally, firms need to have
a portfolio strategy when seeking to collaborate with universities; for example, they
may make plans for specific technological and innovation activities, particularly
matching the stage of firm development with the research capabilities of various uni-
versities. In short, we suggest that the need for policy makers to change the funding
systems and academic assessment system of universities to remove the barriers to
knowledge transfer from universities to the business sector is significantly obvious,
and thus, firms in turn can be able to deepen and extend their collaboration with
universities to purposively benefit from university research.
We acknowledge two limitations and future research directions. First, this study
investigate research question, in the context of developing countries by taking the
biggest developing country as a case, while future studies may extend the research to
the context of other developing countries with commonalities and differences in
terms of the funding and academic assessment systems, and thus can further testify
the findings in this study and draw implications for firms operating in developing
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countries. Second, this study investigates the relationship between government and
industry funding from an input perspective, but whether government funding and
industry funding result in different university research outputs is unknown because it
is possible that government funding substitutes for industry funding and simultan-
eously makes the university research more productive than industry funding.
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